

# Sophia-R

Sophia University Repository for Academic Resources

Title	The Port of Jolo and the Sulu Zone Slave Trade: An 1845 Report
Author(s)	Warren, James Francis
Journal	上智アジア学, (25)
Issue Date	2007-12-27
Type	紀要/Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version	出版者/Publisher
URL	<a href="http://repository.cc.sophia.ac.jp/dspace/handle/123456789/15569">http://repository.cc.sophia.ac.jp/dspace/handle/123456789/15569</a>
Rights	

## **The Port of Jolo and the Sulu Zone Slave Trade: An 1845 Report\***

James Francis WARREN\*\*

### **1. The Port of Jolo: International Trade and Slave Raiding**

The impact of the West's commercial intrusion in China at the end of the eighteenth century had significant bearing on the growth of the slave trade in Southeast Asia. It led to the establishment of a permanent slave traffic around organized markets and ports in the Sulu Zone. Jolo island with its port(s), as the center of a redistributive network encompassing the Sulu Zone, became one of the most important slaving centers by 1800.<sup>(1)</sup> For several centuries, the Sulu-Mindanao region had been known for 'piracy' and slavery. However, by the early nineteenth century, entire ethnic groups such as the Iranun and Balangingi now specialized in state sanctioned maritime slave raiding, attacking Southeast Asian coastal settlements and trading vessels bound for the Spice Islands, or for Singapore, Manila, and Batavia. Consequently, much of eastern Indonesia was to be scoured clean of labor power. At this critical juncture in the political and economic development of the Sulu Sultanate, Iranun and Balangingi slaving and raiding evolved into large-scale operations, and massive raids were conducted throughout the Philippines. One British emissary sent on a fact finding mission who visited Jolo, the chief port and seat of the Sultanate on the island of Jolo, during this period of remarkable expansion, described it as, "the greatest slave mart and thieves market in the whole of the East Indian Islands. The pirate fleets return here after

---

\*This paper was presented at a workshop entitled, "The Slave Trade and the Transformation of Societies in Maritime Southeast Asia", held on March 26, 2007 at Sophia University. I would like to thank the Convenors of the workshop for their interest and support of my research on the Sulu Zone. The workshop was organized by Group 2 "Development of Islam in Southeast Asia" of the Section for Islamic Area Studies, Institute of Asian Cultures of Sophia University(SIAS), and sponsored by the NIHU Program Islamic Area Studies.

\*\* Professor, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Murdoch University.

their long cruise to sell their slaves and booty, and buy supplies from the Chinese and Bugis merchants.”<sup>(2)</sup>

A key factor in Jolo’s ascendancy as a slaving port and regional entrepot, was Europe’s globalizing trade with China. The West’s search for suitable local commodities to exchange for Chinese tea is certainly the most convincing explanation for the origin of the Sulu Sultanate’s startling regional expansion to the west and south.<sup>(3)</sup> Here the broad backdrop of the Sulu Zone and the slaving port of Jolo, provide the setting to inquire into the struggles and misunderstandings that linked patterns of consumption and ‘frontiers’ of desire in Europe, China, and Southeast Asia, with particular entangled commodities, maritime spaces, and cultural geographies.

The insatiable demands of the Sultanate for labor to harvest and procure exotic natural commodities such as sea cucumber and bird’s nest, reached a peak in the first half of the nineteenth century, as the China trade flourished. Now in this new globalized world, Jolo, Balangingi, Canton, and London were all intimately interconnected. For the sultan, with his port-capital located on the seacoast, the entrepot and neighboring areas incorporated a set of cultural-institutional practices typical of centralized trading states, based on redistribution for the production and acquisition of trade goods on the one hand, and kinship, warfare, slavery, and other forms of organization and culture on the other. Within the Sulu zone centers of distribution and exchange developed, and in association with the development of larger inter-regional markets, capital flows, and technology transfers, international trade increased, and the Sultanate established itself as a major regional entrepot and slave emporium. When English country traders like Dalrymple, Rennel, Forrest and others first came to Sulu in the 1760s, they had already recognized the fact that the ‘zone’ was a potentially inexhaustible source of exotic natural commodities for the China trade.<sup>(4)</sup> The subsequent steady influx of captives and slaves to collect and process these commodities for the thriving Canton trade, made the Sulu Sultanate one of the most strategic cultural crossroads to conduct global-local commerce in insular Southeast Asia.

At the start of the nineteenth century, the population of the Sulu Sultanate was heterogeneous, and changing-socially, economically, and ethnically. This was a direct result of external trade. The populating of the Sulu Zone by captives and slaves from the Philippines and various parts of the Malay world and their role in the redistributive economy centered at Jolo, was not fully understood by the colonial powers at the time. Hence, slavery in Sulu was observed through the eyes and preconceptions of European observers, writers, and officials, who viewed Sulu as the center of a world fundamentally hostile to their interests, an Islamic world whose activities centered about slavery and piracy.

One extraordinary feature of the global interconnection between Sulu slavery and the advent of the capitalist world economy was the rapid systematic movement of maritime slave raiding across the entire region, as one Southeast Asian coastal population after another was hunted down. From 1768 to 1848, Southeast Asia felt the full force of the slave raiders of the Sulu Sultanate. Captive people, in their tens of thousands, were put to work in the Sultanate’s fisheries, in the birds’ nest caves, or in the cultivation of rice and transport of goods to local markets in the redistributive network. Thus the Sulu Sultanate created and

reproduced the material and social conditions for the recruitment and exploitation of slaves in the zone. More than anything else, it was this source and use of dependent labor power that was to give Sulu its distinctive predatory character as a ‘pirate and slave state,’ in the minds of Europeans in the first half of the nineteenth century. Jolo became the nerve center for the coordination of slave raiding and marketing. The French Navigator Pierre Sonnerat has left one of the earliest published references to Jolo after it had become the common market of the Iranun and Samal Balangingi slave raiders: “...the harbour serves as a retreat for the moors, who roam over the seas as pirates molesting the navigation of the Spaniards, and sometimes they carry off with them the people of the colonies in their incursions, whom they make slaves.”<sup>(5)</sup> In return for providing security, equipment, vessels, and sometimes crew to the Iranun and Balangingi, the Taosug *datu*<sup>(6)</sup>s received in exchange wealth in the form of exotic natural commodities, and slaves as manpower.

By the dawn of the nineteenth century, slavery and slave raiding were fundamental to the state. The Taosug aristocracy depended for its prosperity on the labor of slaves and sea raiders, who fished for *tripang*<sup>(7)</sup>, dived for pearls, and manned the slaving fleets. Global trade created the material and social conditions for the large scale recruitment of slaves and the exploitation of dependent communities. At the same time, the labour of captive and tributary peoples provided the raw materials for expanding trade. More than anything else it was this source and application of labour that was to give the port of Jolo and the Sulu Sultanate its distinctive predatory character in the eyes of Europeans as a slave market and pirate state without comparison in island Southeast Asia.

## 2. Know Your Enemy: Sources of Intelligence on the Sulu Slave Trade

Spain chose to wage a defensive ‘sea war’ in Philippine waters against the Iranun and Balangingi. The official assumption was that cruising, construction of coastal defence networks, and the building of *vintas*<sup>(8)</sup> and *barangayan*<sup>(9)</sup> deterred raiding. However, the most obvious solution to the slave raiding problem would have been to launch a major offensive against the principal centers of Iranun and Balangingi raiding, and the occupation of the port of Jolo. But this preemptive strategy was not in the best interests of a Manila administration which was in the ironic position of developing a lucrative regional trade with Sulu, a trade that was inadvertently predicated on the slaving and ‘piracy’ it so religiously decried.

The British and Dutch realized that if they just ignored the Iranun and Balangingi they would become bigger, more dangerous, and equipped with ever more sophisticated raiding technology, and that is exactly what happened in the first half of the nineteenth century with Philippine and eastern Indonesian waters having the highest risk of coastal and maritime attacks, and the number of cases increasing every year. At the start of the nineteenth century the total number of Iranun sea raiders was not known, but across island Southeast Asia they must have conservatively numbered between 10,000 and 15,000. In the eyes of the Dutch and British there were more than enough of them based in Mindanao, Sulu, Sulawesi, Borneo, and Sumatra, to be considered the scourge of the seas from Papua to the Straits of

Malacca, forcing the Netherlands East Indies and Straits governments to take draconian measures to contain them. Mr. J. Hunt, an East India Company servant was despatched by Sir Stamford Raffles to the Sulu Archipelago shortly after the occupation of Java in 1811. Hunt published, at Raffles request an on-the-spot account of what he had seen in the port, along with the information he had collected, in which he identified 12 different 'piratical establishments' belonging to Sulu, of which the total fleet was estimated at about 200 *prahus*<sup>(10)</sup>, and above 8,000 slave raiders.<sup>(11)</sup>

In Hunt's account of Sulu based on first class intelligence, he distinctly charged the sultan with participating in the profits of the 'pirates' of the Sulu-Mindano region. Some of the Iranun and Balangingi prisoners who after an 1838 trial in Singapore were brought once again before the Admiralty Court, corroborated Hunt's statement by maintaining that "to this day the sultan still continues to receive a certain portion of the plunder from the boats on their return to Sooloo."<sup>(12)</sup> When Captain Belcher visited Jolo in the mid 1840s in command of the frigate HMS *Samarang*, he was repeatedly reassured by leading Tausug *datus* that they had no connection whatsoever with these maritime raiders, who preferred 'self destruction to submitting to capture.'<sup>(13)</sup> But during his stay in the Jolo roadstead several Balangingi *prahus* arrived, and the English naval commander was duly informed that slaves captured in the Philippines by these vessels were exchanged in the local market. In Belcher's mind this 'event' was graphic proof of the fact that the sultan and *datus* had created a complex interdependent political and economic system, to regulate the slave trade and the activities of slave raiding ships based in the Sulu zone.

It was during the 1830s and 1840s that handpicked naval commanders of various colonial powers, struggling to rid Southeast Asia of maritime slaving and raiding, men like Captains Kolf, Blake, Belcher, and Don Jose Maria Halcon, exchanged intelligence and published warnings across the region about the arms trade and its direct links to Iranun-Balangingi raiding and the slave trade.<sup>(14)</sup> In the decade of the 1830s they had been placed in charge of surveillance operations, cruising, and search and destroy missions. But these commanders had not been able to observe any positive effect such measures had on curbing either the arms or slave traffic. Regional wide sightings of heavily-armed 'Illanoon' expeditions and the number of reported attacks on coastal settlements and *prahu* shipping rose steadily in the years between 1826 and 1836.

To the Spanish the Iranun and Balangingi, irrespective of whether there was war or peace around the globe, were simply the arch-enemy 'moros,' 'piratas,' and 'contrabandistas.'<sup>(15)</sup> A Spanish writer described the wholesale misery inflicted over a period of 86 years by the Iranun and Balangingi on the inhabitants of the archipelago, as a chapter in the history of Spain and the Philippines "written in blood and tears and nourished in pain and suffering."<sup>(16)</sup> In the 1780s slave raiding began in earnest, and for the next eighty years the coastal towns of southern Luzon, the Visayas and northwestern Mindanao were the scenes of persistent, well-organized slave raids, which were on a huge scale and almost always launched from the sea.<sup>(17)</sup>

Friars in beleaguered towns and villages on Luzon, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte, and Samar wrote accounts of these violent slave raids. The Iranun raiders were depicted as appalling savages and plunderers, unparalleled in the experience of the writers. It is of course possible that

some of these friar accounts of the depredations of the ‘*moros*’ may have been exaggerated somewhat by the fear and horror of a Muslim enemy who reduced churches to ashes and carried women and children off into slavery, but generally the information in their letters and petitions corresponds closely with the informative accounts of Iranun slave raids written by merchant-traders like Thomas Forrest and others, in the very different cultural atmosphere of cosmopolitan Jolo and other neighboring Malayo-Muslim states.

The naval authorities recognized that besides the accounts of merchant traders and friars, by also studying the intelligence provided by fugitive captives and captured slavers they could better comprehend the forces that shaped the way of life of the Iranun and Balangingi, as well as explore the lives and fate of those captured and enslaved. The statements of the fugitive captives carried a self-affixed stamp of authenticity for the colonial authorities. Most statements and captivity narratives have a first person observer-narrator, an authentic voice of experience from the other side of the line, attempting to present a testimony or narrative that usually contains similarities with other accounts dealing with the same subjects, namely the dominant ways of organizing maritime life, slave raiding and marauding, the forms and allocation of labor, and, whether these institutions and activities fit into a widely accepted social and cultural pattern. Most captive statements were taken down in the bay of Jolo, when slaves escaped to visiting European merchant vessels or warships. The statements contain data on the social status of slaves, their occupations, and their roles on board the slaving vessels. Spanish and Dutch strategic interests required information on the social organization of maritime slave raiding and ethnic interrelations in the Sulu-Mindanao region, and consequently evidence given in interrogations revolved around these issues. Many of the Spanish statements concern the experiences of slaves who fled from the port of Jolo, with the rest furnished by those who were either rescued by cruising expeditions, or who managed to escape from Iranun forward bases in places like Tempasuk and Marudu Bay.

### 3. An 1845 Report on Slave Marketing in Jolo

In an effort to lay out the wide ranging activities of these slave raiders, activities which extended from the Bay of Bengal to the Timor and Arafura seas, and to unravel the structural basis of the system of social and political organization which united them, it was especially necessary to also gather vital intelligence about their way of life provided by European traders travelling between Manila and Jolo. In the twenty years after 1807, the number of Spanish vessels involved in the trade doubled. Native sailing craft were replaced by brigantines and frigates as Spanish vessels in increasing numbers visited Sulu. Rare fragments of evidence suggest that occasionally Spanish captains who entered the port of Jolo maintained a confidential daily log of occurrences during their stay, replete with observations on current political developments, the number of slaving vessels entering the bay and harbour, and estimates on the numbers captured and brought to be sold.<sup>(18)</sup> One such individual in the pay of the Spanish authorities was the Spanish merchant captain Juan Bautista Barrera, who moored his vessel in the Jolo roadstead from late May to mid-

September 1845, during which period quite a few fugitive captives escaped to his vessel. The Captain comments at some length in his daily log on this precarious albeit dangerous state of affairs in the slaving port:

*Regarding several captives who have escaped from this evil town several days ago, there is a rumor (circulating) amongst these moros that I have a boatload of captives from Jolo (sad to say this is not true). However, my local agent and go-between, as well as myself, have already told these swine that they can come on board whenever they wished to do so. On the 19<sup>th</sup> September, at 10 o'clock in the evening, about 18 moros went to the house of my agent, telling him that they knew that I had hidden many captives, men and women (it is a fact that I indeed had some on board, but all of them were from distant towns), and if none of them were given up they would kill me or any of my crew that they could catch.<sup>(19)</sup>*

Barrera noted in conjunction with this incident that almost all the Iranun and Balangingi slaving commanders who frequented the port of Jolo to trade more or less did what they pleased, without any interference from the Sultan.<sup>(20)</sup> He soon discovered too that the Taosug merchants or “rogues and riff-raff of this wretched town,” when they did not have sufficient goods to meet their outstanding obligations with respect to debts or trade, also visited Balangingi where they were given captives on credit to be trafficked to Borneo and exchanged for *tripang* and birds nests.”<sup>(21)</sup> By September, the scale of the slaving activity would leave the Spanish captain in a rather demoralized state, and he tersely noted in his log on 15<sup>th</sup> September, “This afternoon, 5 *pancos*<sup>(22)</sup> anchored carrying forty captives.” He then added in brackets, “at this moment in time life seems have dealt us a mortal blow!”<sup>(23)</sup>

But from the late 1830s until the mid 1850s, one trader in particular, an English mariner, was to supply a singular, albeit inside analysis to the Manila authorities and the outside world about the slave trade at the port of Jolo, information which would enable English and Spanish naval intelligence to conduct field operations against the Iranun and Balangingi in a far more lethal manner. William Wyndham had firmly established Sulu’s trade link with Singapore by the early 1840s. He began his career in the Philippine archipelago as a mate on a Spanish brig trading from Manila to the Moluccas, and subsequently sailed as the commander of various vessels which traded throughout the eastern archipelago, but particularly to Sulu.<sup>(24)</sup> By 1842, the shrewd, self-educated merchant adventurer had settled at Jolo and owned his own schooner, the *Velocipede*. From his commercial establishment in Jolo’s Chinese quarter, he frequented the pearl banks of the Aru Islands to procure tortoise shells and mother of pearl for customers in Singapore. Married to a *mestiza* from Iloilo, Wyndham spoke fluent Taosug and Visayan and had acquired considerable status and authority in Jolo. In 1848, Spencer St. John described him as being “dressed in Malay costume, and from long residence among them he assumed much of both the appearance and manner of a native.”<sup>(25)</sup> Not surprisingly, many Manila based Spanish captains who traded at Jolo repeatedly accused him of trafficking with the Taosug and Iraunun in munitions, saltpetre and opium.

This enigmatic individual who lived for at least fifteen years in Jolo with his *mestiza* wife

and daughter possessed great influence with the Taosug, who made him a *datu*. He ransomed dozens of captives from his trading base at Jolo and acted as intermediary on behalf of scores of others in their ransom dealings and negotiations with Spanish captains.<sup>(26)</sup> In September 1845, Captain Barrera described Wyndham's efforts to ransom and free captives in the aftermath of the punitive expedition of the Spanish warship *Esperanza*, in the following manner:

*Don Guillermo, as well as his brother-in-law are admired by the many captives whom they have brought and are bringing since the departure of war frigate from this port. He says that in the eighteen or twenty years of travelling to this infamous port, he has never seen so many captives being trafficked, and that the atrocities committed by the pirates in the Visayas and the provinces to the North are a great shame.*<sup>(27)</sup>

The Spanish Governor General had left an advance column of troops and engineers behind to establish a small fort on the neighboring island of Basilan, in the aftermath of the recent cruising expedition against Balangingi. The small well-fortified outpost, flying the Spanish Flag in the heartland of the Sultanate, attracted immediate Taosug attention. Barrera's log notes that on 18<sup>th</sup> August, 5 Iranun vessels from Basilan entered the port, reporting to the Sultan that the Governor of Zamboanga had established a fort on the island. The Spanish trader records the Sultan's consternation about this sudden turn of events, and that he had personally ordered the Iranun of Basilan to expel the Governor's representative from the island along with his garrison. If they did not leave peaceably, they were to either kill him or imprison him along with his men, in order to "send a message about the temerity of the Spaniards in wishing to govern in a domain that does not belong to them."<sup>(28)</sup> The Sultan organised an Iranun flotilla giving them cannon and other equipment to either drive out or destroy the Governor's representative on Basilan. Wyndham and the Spanish merchant both got wind of the planned expedition and attempted to warn the Governor of Zamboanga, but the Sultan set up a zone of interdiction for all vessels entering and leaving the port of Jolo:

*Don Guillermo, as well as myself wanted to write to the said Governor about the betrayal being planned by these moros for him. However, this was not possible because after the embargo on the departure of pancos for Zamboanga, all or almost all the letters that we had written for that destination and Manila had been intercepted and surrendered to the datos.*<sup>(29)</sup>

Fearing possible English or Dutch intrusion in the Sulu archipelago, Spain had adopted a hard line along the borders of its southern frontier, and had attempted to destroy the Samal "pirate nests" on Balangingi with a major military expedition in 1845. This initial offensive visibly shook the confidence of the Taosug and convinced them of the necessity of English friendship and trade. The Sultanate severed its well established commercial ties with Manila and welcomed the assistance of James Brooke, the politically ambitious Governor of Labuan,



who sought to protect Sulu from the Spanish embrace at the same time that he destroyed the Iranun stranglehold on the trade and traffic of north Borneo. However, by the mid-1840s the Spanish had formulated a strategic plan of occupying key positions in the Iranun-Balangingi heartlands. The theory now expressed by Spanish naval experts was to control Iranun and Balangingi ‘piracy’ at the source, or at least check slave raiding by establishing forward bases for naval operations, and as places of refuge for victims of Iranun and Balangingi aggression. A Spanish naval officer, reconnoitring Balangingi in a disguised sailing craft in 1842, had already described the Sulu Sultanate’s key raiding base, slowly but surely improving Manila’s naval intelligence about this mysterious island bastion.

On the basis of such intelligence, Governor Claveria, to protect Spain’s claim to sovereignty over the Sulu archipelago from political interference by European powers, had authorized a major expedition against Balangingi in 1845, and had established a small fort and naval base on Basilan. Although the expedition had been ill-prepared, lacking sufficient troops, artillery and scaling ladders, and had ultimately failed, the Spanish managed for the first time to completely reconnoitre the Samalese group, and formed a detailed picture of the topography, defences, and population of Balangingi. Armed with this information, Claveria now devoted several years to organizing a far more formidable expedition, comprised of the best trained and equipped troops. Claveria understood that control of Balangingi would cut the Sulu archipelago in two, and largely curtail slave raiding in the Philippines.

Interestingly, Barrera wrote in his log on 29 July, 1845 that a somewhat chastened Sultan, still smarting from the Spanish attack against Balangingi, had ordered that no more Iranun and Balangingi slaving *prahus* were to enter the port of Jolo because he realized that their movements were now being monitored and reported to the Government of Manila by individuals like Wyndham and Barrera. The Spanish captain then concludes, “The Sultan does not want it to be said (in government circles) that Jolo is the major emporium for captives and slaves, as he is afraid that some heavily armed vessels will come to initiate a war against them.”<sup>(30)</sup> But less than a month later in a complex cat and mouse game, this growing concern to placate the Spanish still did not prevent the Sultan from secretly planning with his Iranun allies to destroy the newly established Spanish outpost on Basilan, and block all trade between there and Zamboanga.<sup>(31)</sup>

The rate of growth of the Sultanate’s population had not kept pace with its rapidly expanding globalized economy. The West’s insatiable desire for natural commodities acceptable in Chinese markets promoted an intensification of Taosug sponsored Iranun-Samal slaving expeditions, to seize captives to labor in the fisheries and forests of the Sultanate’s domain. It was Visayan, Minahassan and Bugis captives as well as flotillas of nomadic Samal Bajau Laut that procured the *tripang*, mother of pearls and tortoise shells that European traders bartered in China for tea, while the gunpowder and firearms supplied by these same merchants allowed the coastal-dwelling Taosug to promote maritime slave raiding on a hitherto unprecedented scale, and kept the Sulu-Mindanao region free of neighboring competitors and colonial intruders until the late 1840s.

#### 4. The Workings of a Slave Port

It is difficult to estimate the annual number of Filipinos directly lost to maritime slave raiding through captivity and death at the end of the eighteenth century. In 1761, the Bishop of Nueva Caceres in southern Luzon was unable to provide an overall figure for the decline in the population of his provinces, but conservatively estimated the loss in Camarines alone between 1759-1760 at 800 people.<sup>(32)</sup> In 1817, more than half a century later, the Bishop estimated that Iranun and Balangingi raiders had captured more than 1,500 people, predominantly boys and girls, from the cabeceras and visitas of Albay, Camarines and Tayabas.<sup>(33)</sup> By 1830, the intensity of Balangingi slave-raiding, inextricably linked to Sulu's expanding global economy, would tend to support an estimate that on an average 750-1,500 Filipinos were carried off or killed from Nueva Caceres alone, annually. Further, the cumulative totals rose in the first half of the nineteenth century, at an annual rate that was greater than in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. However, direct losses from slave raids varied considerably in different parts of the archipelago. Cruikshank conservatively estimates that 100 inhabitants of Samar were either captured or killed each year between 1768 and 1858.<sup>(34)</sup>

The Balangingi slavers were forced to rely on the Taosug credit system to sustain their food supply. Rice was either brought directly to the Samal islands in Taosug trading *prahus* or obtained in Jolo at the advanced rate of thirty cavans per slave in 1836. The actual extent to which the Balangingi were at the mercy of their environment, is reflected in the annual turnover of large numbers of captives and slaves by the Samal raiders to the Taosug for advances (or payment of previous advances) of rice and war stores. In 1836, Mariano Sevilla estimated that the Balangingi had seized more than a thousand captives from the Philippines by September, of which two-thirds had already been taken to Jolo.<sup>(35)</sup> Nine years later, Captain Barrera's daily log, tracking the number of Balangingi *garay*<sup>(36)</sup> entering Jolo and the numbers captured and brought to be sold in the port, indicates that the slave trade had continued to escalate. His invaluable register begins on 24<sup>th</sup> May, noting the arrival at three o'clock in the afternoon of three Balangingi vessels with 45 captives; four days later, at ten in the morning, two slaving vessels came into the port with 20 captives. Five entries appear in the Log for June, suggesting that the slave raiders tended to maintain a weekly cycle and never arrived with more than four large vessels at any one time; 3rd June, 5 o'clock in the afternoon, a single large vessel with 8 captives; a week later, 4 large *garay* anchored with 28 captives; 15<sup>th</sup> June, 3 *garay* anchored with two raiding canoes which carried 18 captives, amongst them men, women and children; at midday a week later, 2 *garay* arrived with 18 captives; the last entry for the month, 30<sup>th</sup> June, saw 4 *garay* arrive, with 32 captives; amongst them seven women and 5 boys and girls.<sup>(37)</sup>

The log also records on 13<sup>th</sup> July some rather disturbing news about the magnitude of the traffic. Wyndham and Barrera had learned from the Balangingi commander of a slave raider that between two to three thousand Visayans had already been enslaved by July of that year. They had also found out that the Balangingi had sent out no less than 80 *garay* to avenge the damage wrought by the Spanish war frigate, *Esperanza*, against their island stronghold. Five days later Barrera wrote the following in his log on 18<sup>th</sup> July: "From a pirate vessel that has

just arrived, I have learned that 20 days ago, more than 120 Visayans had been captured in Romblon, Mindoro, Surigao and Panay. This vessel brought ten captives.”<sup>(38)</sup> There are six entries for the month of July, indicating that the slavers tended to visit the port on a weekly basis. Large and small vessels carrying slaves arrived in Jolo on the 5th, 10th, 13th, 18th, 24th, and 29th of the month, when two *garay* arrived with 18 captives, and the Spaniard received from their crew the chilling news that the 80 slave raiders sent out the previous month had already captured more than 250 people.<sup>(39)</sup>

In early August, eight smaller slaving vessels arrived and anchored, bringing 30 captives. Barrera notes that concerning these vessels, the Sultan had “turned a blind eye.” He then angrily completes his entry for 2<sup>nd</sup> August, directly implicating the Sultan in the slave trade:

*To this I say: in my view of these events, and from the things that I have found out from these Joloanos, the Balangingi will never stop bringing captives, being encouraged to do so by the Sultan right down to the last vile datu. They are the ones who provide the pirates with all kinds of warstores, to such a great extent that the above mentioned William Wyndham as well as the three of us Spaniards who are involved in this (trade), realize that everyone from the Sultan on down, are knaves. If we were to write down everything that has happened since the departure from here of the frigate Esperanza, a hundred reams of paper would not suffice.”*<sup>(40)</sup>

The human traffic continued throughout August with the confidential log listing five visits to the port between the 2nd and 18th of the month. Large numbers of fresh captives and slaves were being brought to Jolo on a weekly basis, and the entry for 15th August reads as follows: “Eight vintas came in with 35 captives. They say they still have to bring in 100 more captives.”<sup>(41)</sup> Three days later, in an extremely detailed account, mention is made for the first time that the *datus* also travelled directly to Balangingi, where they obtained captives on credit to be taken to Borneo to be exchanged for birds’ nests and *tripang*.<sup>(42)</sup> Between September 3rd and the 23rd when Barrera wrote his last entry in the log, there were nine separate occasions when groups of two to five large slaving vessels arrived bringing captives. Again, the scale and intensity of the slave raiding taking place in the latter half of 1845 was reflected in the intelligence gathered by Wyndham and Barrera on 6th September, at dockside in the port of Jolo: “4 *garay* arrived with 35 captives captured 25 days ago in Panay and Mindoro. From the 20th of August up to the 4th of September, they had captured about 210 captives, according to information from these same pirates.”<sup>(43)</sup> In other words, the Balangingi were seizing about a 100 captives a week in the central Visayas alone. Six days later, the daily log lists 3 very big *garay* anchoring at ten o’clock in the morning, with 40 captives who had been seized 35 days earlier in Masbate, Romblon and Panay. Barrera then penned the following ominous observation in brackets :... (“if at this stage they go out slave raiding again right away (*pronto*) in the Visayas, some provinces will become totally uninhabited”).<sup>(44)</sup>

## 5. Individual Fates

Based on the intelligence gathered with the assistance of Wyndham and his brother-in-law, glimpses of the experience of the captives from the time of their seizure to their arrival and exchange in Jolo, emerge from anonymity in the weekly entries in Captain Barrera's daily confidential log. The total effect of the information provided about these individual cases of captives and slaves being trafficked, exchanged, and ransomed in the port of Jolo, is to throw very considerable light on the internal workings of the slave trade and its conduct in the bay of Jolo in the middle of the nineteenth century. In Jolo a great many factors were taken into consideration when determining the value of individual slaves in the market. The prices varied with sex, age, ethnicity, and personal condition, as well as demand. The highest prices were reserved for young women, who could be offered as wives and concubines to recruit warriors to a *datu's* retinue, and adolescents and children, who were considered malleable and therefore more readily incorporated into Taosug or Samal society.<sup>(45)</sup> There appears to have been a standard schedule of prices for various categories of slaves, but the basic price level varied according to Sulu's political, economic and demographic situation. In 1726, the value of a slave in Jolo was as follows: "a man or woman in excellent health, forty pesos; a man or woman with a weak constitution, thirty pesos; boys and girls, twenty pesos; and small children, ten pesos."<sup>(46)</sup> By the beginning of the 19th century, due to ethnic and social transformation in the Sulu Zone, the price of female slaves was now much higher than male slaves, indicating the important role they played both biologically and socially in the reproductive and recruitment process. In general, the price of a male slave varied according to his age and qualifications from twenty to thirty pesos; the price of a female slave now ranged from between sixty to one hundred pesos and occasionally more, her value more than doubling in some instances depending on her age and ability to work and bear children, while small children were estimated to be worth half the price of a man.<sup>(47)</sup>

Taosug *datu's*, European traders, Chinese merchants, Visayan renegades, and tribal chiefs from Borneo all gathered in Jolo's market to purchase slaves and captives from the Iranun and Balangingi. As early as 1774, Colonel Juan Cencilli noted in a confidential report that Jolo's slave market operated on a preferential basis, with the Iranun reserving all Spaniards and friars for the Taosug, who also had their pick of the Filipinos before the Chinese and other prospective customers were allowed to purchase their human cargoes.<sup>(48)</sup> The Taosug *datu's* involved in global-local trading, procurement activities, and rice cultivation, would dominate the purchase of slaves in Sulu throughout the first half of the nineteenth century as well.

The experience of women as slaves in the Sulu Zone differed for both biological reasons because of their sexual and reproductive use, and for socio-cultural reasons related to the gender division of labor. Barrera's log attempted to keep track of the number of captive women arriving in slave *prahus*. He recorded four entries in June when Balangingi slaving vessels arrived with cargoes of women. On 3rd June one *garay* arrived in the afternoon with 3 captive women on board; on 10<sup>th</sup> June, 4 slaving vessels arrived and dropped anchor, and among the 28 captives were 6 women and 4 children aged between 6 and 10 years, who had

been caught three weeks earlier in the Camarines; on 15<sup>th</sup> June, informants told Barrera that there were women and children on board the 3 *garay* that had arrived that day; and, at the end of the month, the Spanish captain learned that 4 *garay* had arrived on 30<sup>th</sup> June, carrying 32 captives and among them were 7 women and 5 children, both boys and girls, with some as young as two years of age.<sup>(49)</sup> While the entry for 6th August states, “at eight o’clock this morning, a woman who was captured last year in April was rescued.” This woman stated that she had been on board a trading vessel of the Alcalde of Batangas, which transported tobacco to Manila. She told Barrera that her companions on the ill-fated voyage were two women, and three men.<sup>(50)</sup> Then almost three weeks later on 26th August, the largest slaving flotilla to enter the port during Barrera’s stay, anchored. At six in the afternoon, eight *garay* along with four *vintas*, brought almost a 100 captives to the Jolo market, and among them were 25 women and 12 young children who had been caught while either on a government coast guard vessel bound for Manila, or on board several small defenceless coasting *prahus* that had originated from Surigao.<sup>(51)</sup>

Captives ransomed by Wyndham and the merchant captains of Spanish trading vessels frequently moored in the bay of Jolo, were a key source of intelligence to the Spanish about the traditional Taosug social system and everyday life in the slaving port. From the statements of fugitive captives it is clear that women were less likely to attempt escape in the face of the violence and domination of an overweening master, and more apt to be resigned to their fate. But in the 1840s, the increased prospect of ransom by a Manila based trader readily crossed the minds of some female captives, especially among the newly enslaved, who were not yet reconciled to their fate. Barrera’s log lists the dates and cases of those ‘unfortunates’ who he was able to ransom and others either ransomed or brought to him by Wyndham and his brother-in-law. His log notes the arrival on 5<sup>th</sup> July of seven *vintas*, with 17 captives. It then states, “On this same day, an unfortunate woman was ransomed.” She had been captured in March of the previous year while leaving Sorsogon with some relatives and friends to attend a *fiesta* in a neighboring town. Her ransom was set at 22 pesos fuertes. Barrera closed the entry as follows. “At the same time, I ransomed two men who arrived with her. These men cost me 12 pesos.” The price set for the ransom of this woman, which was double the amount paid for the two male captives who had been brought with her to be exchanged for either cash or kind, signified the high value and status of female slaves in Jolo in the mid-1840s.<sup>(52)</sup> One of the longest entries in the log recounts the plight of a woman of some means and her family, who were bound from Surigao to Manila on a *falua*, a government coast guard vessel that was attacked. Wyndham subsequently ransomed her on arrival in Jolo. Barrera carefully recorded the circumstances of what happened on 26<sup>th</sup> August, as eight Balangingini *garay* anchored along with four *vintas*, carrying about 100 captives.

*On it (the falua) was a married couple, and their three children, two of whom were aged between 10 and 12 years old. The poor mother, inconsolable, has been ransomed by William Wyndham, at the value of sixty four pesos fuertes, She asked the said gentleman to ransom the rest of the family, for the value of five hundred pesos.*<sup>(53)</sup>

The woman told Wyndham and Barrera, that including herself, the Balangingi on her vessel alone had caught about 30 captives. Apart from this, the raiding squadron had “plundered” the town of Surigao, and devastated a part of the province of Caraga. The number of captives rose to 250, and more than three thousand pesos in cash was lost as well as goods of lesser value.<sup>(54)</sup>

To be ransomed either for cash or kind it was necessary for the captives to have a witness from either the same town or province vouch for them, in order to make sure that the ‘fortunate’ individual would repay the debt in due course. Barrera explained how the credit and debt aspects of the ransom system worked for most Filipinos, like in the case of the above-mentioned woman and her family from Surigao. The Spanish merchant stated that “if an unfortunate captive begs him for mercy to free him, he is not told no. However, if he is automatically told yes, then his ransom was set at 40 pesos in pearl shell, or goods of another kind.”<sup>(55)</sup> But if a far greater amount was demanded, as for example between 120 to 150 pesos, as the captive was unable to promise to pay the amount requested for their ransom, they had to have witnesses from the province or town from where they originated in order to be freed, who could act as guarantors against the amount of the ransom. Barrera wrote in the log that without such a guarantor:

*the unfortunate ones are left without receiving any charity from a good heart. Thus, if this practise is done by Christians to other Christians, what would the Moros not do under such circumstances? In such a context, each person fashions their own luck, but now there is a saying here that ‘God does not reserve anything for anybody.’<sup>(56)</sup>*

Barrera closed this late August entry in his log on a note of anger as well as recording a feeling of helplessness and frustration as to the plight of such captives, especially women and mothers, then being brought into the port of Jolo:

*I myself have been speaking with these pirates, and I have been extremely irritated by the insolence and effrontery with which they have spoken to me. However, at the same time, I had to control myself and conceal my feelings so as to avoid personal danger, and other possible outcomes. The feeling of witnessing the personal outpouring of the unfortunate Mother pleading for her sons, and them for her swayed my emotions even more.<sup>(57)</sup>*

It was the fate of other less fortunate captives, who could not afford to be ransomed, to be taken across the zone to the coast of east Borneo for sale. Riverine tribes on the Kinabatangan, Sambakong, Bulungun and Berau rivers were involved in the slave trade with Taosug merchants, who had gained a permanent foothold on the east Borean coast. These Taosug middlemen acquired bird’s nest and wax for the external trade at Jolo in return for the captives. The traditional mortuary ceremony held among the head-hunting Ida’an, Kenyah and Kayan referred to by European observers of the late eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries as ‘surmungup’, a ritual sacrifice, accounted for much of the demand for captives by these interior tribes. These swidden cultivators were among the most ardent headhunters in Borneo. The veneration of heads was central to their way of life. Fresh heads were required for *mamat*, recurrent head feasts, which accompanied purification, funeral and initiation ceremonies.<sup>(58)</sup> Traditionally, small parties led by war chiefs participated in organized raids against rival long-house groups and neighboring tribes for this purpose. The intrusive effects of external trade from Jolo were felt among these tribes, for whom bird’s nest became the key to acquiring the slaves (an alternative source of heads), cloth and salt offered by the Taosug traders of Jolo.<sup>(59)</sup> Barrera notes that Wyndham had informed him based on reliable intelligence from his brother-in-law, that the Balangingi lent Taosug *nakodahs* captives on credit to be taken to the Borneo coast to be “exchanged for sea cucumber and bird’s nest, (that is to say, they use Christians for purposes of trade).”<sup>(60)</sup> On 6<sup>th</sup> September, the entry in Barrera’s log verifies the extent to which long distance trade and slavery had modified the traditional culture of these vigorous predatory slash and burn agriculturalists, especially on the Sibuco and Sambakong rivers. The entry begins by noting that four *garay* anchored, carrying 35 captives from Mindoro and Panay.

This information was followed by a stunning disclosure:

*Today William (Don Guillermo) ransomed a captive whose own master told us that if he was not ransomed, he would have been brought to a port in Borneo, where the entire esteem and wealth of a person there is measured in terms of owning as many heads of captives as possible, and an individual who has many heads hanging in his house, is one who is considered to be one of the bravest and most powerful amongst them.*<sup>(61)</sup>

## 6. Counting the Victims of the Traffic

There are no statistics on the overall number of slaves imported into Jolo between 1768-1848, except the estimates of European observers and local informants. These range from 750 to as high as 4,000 captives per year for the Philippines alone, from 1775 to 1848.<sup>(62)</sup> However, it is possible to reconstruct a clearer picture of the pattern of slave imports to the port of Jolo and the Sulu Sultanate on the basis of the captive’s statements, Barrera’s 1845 log of slaving vessels entering the port of Jolo, and from other sources. By using a comparative sample of boatloads of slaves from these sources to determine the average number carried by an individual *prahu*, and multiplying this figure by the number of raiding *prahus* possessed by Balangingi and Iranun groups, one can establish an estimate of the overall number of slaves imported during a particular period. From 1770-1835, the slave raiding communities had 100-150 *prahus*; from 1836 to 1848, 150-200 *prahus*; and from 1852-1878, 60-100 *prahus*.<sup>(63)</sup> On the basis of the statements of slaves seized between 1826 and 1847 an average of 21 captives were carried in the middle passage on a slaving vessel. This sample supports St. John’s calculation of twenty slaves per *prahu* in 1849.<sup>(64)</sup> However, Barrera’s daily log suggests that the Iranun and Balangingi tended to carry fewer captives

and slaves on board, when they came to Jolo to market them. Barrera's informants were able to provide information over four months about the arrivals of 36 *garay*, bringing 473 captives to sell or exchange, which meant an average of 13 captives per *garay*.<sup>(65)</sup> Clearly this was only a small proportion of the slave imports taking place both at Jolo and Balangingi, as well as elsewhere in the zone. In *The Sulu Zone*, I have argued that slave imports to the Sulu Sultanate during the first sixty-five years probably averaged between 2,000 to 3,000 a year. The steepest rise in the number of slaves annually brought to Sulu, between 3,000 and 4,000, occurred in the period 1836-1848 and slackened considerably in the next several decades, with imports ranging between 1,200 and 2,000 slaves a year until the trade collapsed in the 1870s.<sup>(66)</sup> The figures appear to show that between 200,000 and 300,000 slaves were moved in Iranun and Samal vessels to the Sulu Sultanate in the period from the end of the eighteenth century to 1870. Interestingly, Barrera's 1845 'census' of the Sulu slave trade suggests that the figure on the annual number of slaves imported into Jolo in the second quarter of the nineteenth century needs to be revised upward. Wyndham had categorically stated to Barrera that since he first travelled to Jolo in 1827, he had never seen so many captives being trafficked there. The total number of captives who had been brought to be exchanged or sold by the Balangingi during Barrera's stay in the port of Jolo between the third week of May and the third week of September, 1845, had reached nearly a thousand. But the Spanish captain was sure that during the period of his four month stay the Balangingi had enslaved more than two thousand people from the Visayas alone<sup>(67)</sup>, besides an estimated two to three thousand Visayans whom he was told had already been seized prior to July, 1845. In fact, Barrera's confidential log or 'census' suggests that between 4,000-6,000 Visayans alone were being enslaved on an annual basis by the Balangingi by 1845.<sup>(68)</sup>

The major determinants of the composition of the slave intake were external forces affecting raiding patterns. Until 1848 a larger percentage of the captives (perhaps as high as 65 percent) were from the Philippines, particularly southern Luzon and the central Visayas, while the rest came from various parts of the Malay world, the great majority from Celebes (Tontoli, Amurang, Menado, Gorontalo) and the Moluccas.<sup>(69)</sup> According to Hunt, slaves constituted the bulk of the port-town's population in 1814.<sup>(70)</sup> Commenting on the influx of captives at Jolo and their incorporation into Taosug society, Juan de los Santos stated:

*The Taosug do not participate in slave raids but the people from Balangingi, Tunkil, and the other islands in the Samalese group as well as the Iranun come to Jolo to barter large numbers of Christian captives annually. At present in Jolo there are more captives than Taosugs, with whom they are easily confused. Many of them have intermarried with the Taosug.*<sup>(71)</sup>

Francisco Feliz, another captive, confirmed his observation: "...presently (1836) the number of Christian captives in Jolo is at least twice as great as the Taosug population, the vast majority being Visayan."<sup>(72)</sup> By 1843, Jolo's population had risen to ten thousand, but there were other settlements that were as large, notably Parang.

From the intelligence provided by fugitive captives like Juan de los Santos and Francisco



Feliz, and, the confidential reports of merchants like Barrera and Wyndham, acting in their capacity as defacto spies, it seems clear that before 1850 the size of the slave population was several times larger than that of the dominant society. The balance of these slaves were being incorporated into the population of the Sulu Sultanate, which included perhaps a half a million people by mid-century.<sup>(73)</sup> It was a dynamic process and manumitted slaves and their descendants were continually being redefined according to the ethnicity of their host communities. After 1850, the ethnic class structure would become more stable, and the proportion of locally born slaves increased every year as slave raiding declined. According to the intelligence of these traders and captives, slaves also appear as an important commodity and form of common purpose currency in Sulu's thriving cross-cultural market. The most unfortunate - the elderly and infirm - were shipped to Borneo. Those left behind were absorbed into Sulu society for work in the fisheries and fields. Sulu chiefs involved in trading, slave raiding, and procurement activities came to depend on their own household slaves, and were quite reluctant to give them away. The astonishing fact, however, is that captives or their descendants came to constitute fifty percent or more of the population of the Sulu archipelago by 1850.

The beginning of the end of Iranun and Balangingi slave raiding and the slave market at Jolo, came in 1848. A Spanish fleet including three steam gunboats bombarded the fortress at Balangingi, forcing the slave raiders to abandon their stronghold and disperse across the archipelago. When in that fateful year the Spanish, with the aid of steam warships, successfully destroyed the fortified strongholds in the Balangingi cluster and deported hundreds of Samal maritime people - men, women, and children - to the distant mountain valleys of north central Luzon to become tobacco and corn farmers, the Balangingi slave raiders were dealt a crippling blow from which they would never fully recover.

Prior to 1848, Spanish policy against the Iranun and Balangingi was based on principles of containment. Periodic naval expeditions were sent to destroy the shipping and communities of the slave raiders and their Taosug patrons. However, by the mid-nineteenth century the Spanish authorities had decided to annex a number of the Muslim Sultanates in the south, including Sulu. The major shift in strategic thinking and foreign policy was primarily meant to prevent the British and Dutch from expanding their colonial spheres of interest and territorial ambitions in the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas. The slave raiding activities of the Balangingi would be severely curtailed by the advent of steam gunboats. But in 1848, the Spanish also attempted to use the crusade against slaving and the destruction of the slaver's forts on Balangingi as a pretext to declare war on the Taosug, in order to force the Sultan of Sulu over the next several decades to close down the slave market in his port and sign a treaty acknowledging Spanish sovereignty.<sup>(74)</sup>

## NOTES

- (1) Tomas de Comyn, *State of the Philippines in 1810, Being an Historical, Statistical and Descriptive Account of the Interesting Portion on the Indian Archipelago*. Translated with notes

- and a preliminary discourse by William Walton (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1969), pp.123-24.
- (2) J.Hunt, "Some Particulars Relating to Sulo in the Archipelago of Felicia" in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries*, ed. J.H.Moor (London:Cass,1967), p.5.
  - (3) James FrancisWarren, *The Sulu Zone the World Capitalist Economy and the Historical Imagination* (Amsterdam, VU University Press/CASA, 1998), pp.9-10.
  - (4) Alexander Dalrymple, *Oriental Repertory*, 2 Vols. (London:1808) ; James Rennell, *Journal of a Voyage to the Sooloo Islands and the Northwest Coast of Borneo, from and to Madras with Description of the Islands, 1762-1763*, (London: British Museum) ;Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas from Balambangan: Including an Account of Maguindanao, Sooloo and Other Islands* (London: C.Scott,1779).
  - (5) Pierre Sonnerat, *A Voyage to the East Indies and China Performed by Order of Louis XV between the Years 1774 and 1781*. 3 Vols, Translated by Francis Magnus (Calcutta: Stuart & Cooper, 1788), Vol.3, p.131.
  - (6) Chief or Aristocrat, member of the highest estate.
  - (7) Malay for sea cucumber. A major ingredient for Chinese cuisine.
  - (8) Outriggered sailing vessel of the Philippines varying in length from 15 to upward of 50 feet. In the nineteenth century *barangayan* were used primarily for fishing and the coasting trade.
  - (9) Philippine sailing vessel up to 55 feet in length carrying two masts and worked by oars as well as sails.
  - (10) Malay for sailing craft.
  - (11) Hunt, " Some Particulars Relating to Sulo," pp.50-51, 57-60.
  - (12) Statements of Balangingi Prisoners, 1838, in Bonham to Maitland, 28 June 1838, Public Records Office (PRO), Admiralty, 125/133; *Singapore Free Press*, 28 June, 1838.
  - (13) Edward Belcher, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, during the Years 1843-1846*, 2 Vols. (London: Reeve, Benham and Reeve, 1848),Vol. 2, pp.208-209.
  - (14) *Ibid*; D.H.Kolf, *Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga, through the Southern and Little Known Parts of the Moluccan Archipelago and the Previously Unknown Southern Coast of New Guinea Performed during the Years 1825 and 1826*.Translated by George Windsor Earl (London: James Madden, 1840); Ms.211.Diario de Navegacion del Capitan de Frigata de la Real Armada D. Jose Maria Halcon en su Navegacion de Manila a Jolo con la Galeota de S.M. 'La Olosea' y una division de Faluas Comprende desde 10 Junio de 1836 y abraza noticias peculiares a comision extraordinaria que en calidadde plenipotenciario desenipeno cerca del Sultan de Jolo, Coleccion de Guillen, Museo Naval, Madrid.
  - (15) See James Francis Warren, "Moro" in Ainslie T.Embree (Editor in Chief), *Encyclopedia of Asian History*, Vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), p.39; Charles O. Frake, "The Genesis of Kinds of People in the Sulu Archipelago," in *Language and Cultural Description* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), pp.314-318; Francisco Mallari, S.J. "Muslim Raids in Bicol, 1580-1792," *Philippine Studies*, 34 (1986), p.257.
  - (16) Pablo Fernandez O.P., *History of the Church in the Philippines, 1521-1898* (Manila: National Book Store, 1979), p.203.

- (17) James Francis Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi :Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity* (Singapore:Singapore University Press, 2002), p.72.
- (18) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, y de los pobres que han cautivado, y traído para vender; dando principio el de día que al margen expresa y Mayo de 1845, Juan Bautista Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan. El Viso Del Marques, legajo,1176/262.
- (19) Ibid., p.9.
- (20) Ibid., p.10.
- (21) Ibid., p.6.
- (22) Spanish term used in the Philippines to refer to the largest type of Samal or Iranun raiding craft, between 50-90 feet in length.
- (23) Ibid., p.8.
- (24) No.293, Gobierno Militar de la Plaza de Zamboanga a GCG, 23 August 1847, Philippine National Archive, unclassified legajo(bundle) Mindanao/Sulu.
- (25) Spencer St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, 2 Vols.( London: Smith Elder & Company,1862), Vol.2, p.203.
- (26) Nicholas Loney, *A Britisher in the Philippines or the Letters of Nicholas Loney* ( Manila, 1964), p.64.
- (27) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo,1176/262, p.8.
- (28) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo,1176/262, p.4.
- (29) Ibid.
- (30) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo,1176/262, p.3.
- (31) Ibid., p.4.
- (32) El Arzobispo de Manila a Nuestra Majestad, 31 June 1761, AGI, Filipinas 603; No.46, 17 August, 1770, AGI. Filipinas 490, p.11.
- (33) El Obispo de Nueva Caceres a Nuestraa Majestad, 14 May 1817, AGI, Ultramar 684.
- (34) Bruce Cruikshank, *Samar 1768-1898* (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1985), pp.99-100.
- (35) Statements of Mariano Sevilla, Domingo Candelario, Augustin Juan and Juan Santiago in Expediente No. 12, October 4, 1836, PNA, Mindanao/Sulu,1803-1890; Expediente No.2, El Gobierno Politico y Militar de Zamboanga a GCG, 30 May, 1842, PNA, Mindano/Sulu 1838-1885.
- (36) Balangingi maritime raiding vessel of the nineteenth century.
- (37) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo, 1176/262, p.1.
- (38) Ibid., p.2.
- (39) Ibid., p.3.
- (40) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista

- Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo, 1176/262, p3.
- (41) Ibid., p 4.
  - (42) Ibid., p.6.
  - (43) Ibid., p.7.
  - (44) Ibid., p.8.
  - (45) Extract from the *Singapore Free Press*, 6 April, 1847, PRO Admiralty 125/133.
  - (46) No.7, GCG a Senor Secretario de estado, 4 June 1806, AGI, Filipinas 510, p.27.
  - (47) Extract from the *Singapore Free Press*, 6 April, 1847, PRO Admiralty 125/133.
  - (48) Colonel Juan Cencilli A Senor Conde Aranda, 16 April, 1774, Archivo Historico Nacional (AHN), Estado 2845, caja 2.
  - (49) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo, 1176/262, p.1.
  - (50) Ibid., p.4.
  - (51) Ibid., p.5.
  - (52) Ibid., pp.1-2.
  - (53) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo, 1176/262, p.5.
  - (54) Ibid.
  - (55) Ibid., p.6.
  - (56) Ibid., p.7.
  - (57) Ibid., p.5.
  - (58) Frank M. Le Bar, ed. *Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia*, Vol. 1 (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1972), pp. 170,172.
  - (59) H. Van Dewall, “Aanteekeningen omtrent de Noordoorkust van Borneo”, *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde, uitgegeven door het (Koninklijk ) Bataaviaasch Kunsten en Wetenschappen* 4 (1885), p. 450.
  - (60) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo, 1176/262, p.6.
  - (61) Ibid., p.7.
  - (62) Many of the estimates conservatively ranged from 750-1,500 captives a year. See, No.9, El Consejo de las Indias, 19 December, 1775, AGI, Filipinas 359; Farren to the Earl of Aberdeen, 20 January, 1846, PRO, Foreign Office(FO) 72/708 ; Webb to Lord Russel, 24 October, 1864, FO, 71/1; Hunt, “Some Particulars Relating to Sulo”, pp. 51-562; Bernaldez, *Guerra al Sur*, p.147.
  - (63) El Gobernador Politico y Militar de Zamboanga a GCG, 30 May 1842, PNA, Mindanao /Sulu 1838-1885; Expediente 12 sobre haber salido la expedicion contra Balangingi, 17 February, 1845, PNA , Mindanao /Sulu 1836-1897; information obtained by Charles Grey at Singapore from Mr.Wyndham relating to Sulo, 24 February 1847, PRO Admiralty 125/133.
  - (64) Spencer St. John, “Piracy in the Indian Archipelago”, *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia* 3 (1849), p.258.
  - (65) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista

- Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo, 1176/262.
- (66) Farren to Palmerston, 16 March, 1851 Colonial Office 144/8: for a precise calculation on slave imports to the Sulu Zone, and, the port of Jolo, between 1770 and 1870 I have used the figure of 20.5 slaves per boat in middle passage, based on the statements of the slaves seized between 1826 and 1847 minus 4,800 to 8,000 slaves (1,200 to 2,000 per year) for the period 1848-52. From the calculation it therefore follows that the number of slaves imported over the period 1770-1870 varied from a low estimate of 201,350 to a high estimate of 302,575 (Warren, *The Sulu Zone*, p208) .
- (67) Diario de los Pancos Piratas que han entrado mi residencia en el Puerto de Jolo, Juan Bautista Barrera, 25 September, 1845, Archivo-Museo Don Alavaro de Bazan, legajo, 1176/262, p.11.
- (68) Ibid.
- (69) Expediente 12, 4 October, 1836, PNA, Mindanao /Sulu 1803-1890. See statements of Evaristo Pinto and Francisco Xavier.
- (70) Hunt, "Some Particulars Relating to Sulo," p.50.
- (71) Statement of Juan de los Santos in Expediente 12, 4 October, 1836, PNA, Mindanao/Sulu 1803-1890.
- (72) Ibid.
- (73) James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone 1768-1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), p.210.
- (74) *Ibid.*, pp.105-106.